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We discuss global options for initiatives intended to ameliorate adverse impacts of visa and 
work permit systems used by national governments around the world. We first describe and 
document some of their effects, noting the relative lack of other research work on these 
issues. We then discuss proposals for a new and supplemental global visa structure which 
have been made as part of the Mode 4 GATS negotiations in the WTO, suggesting that the 
GATS/WTO may be an imperfect institutional location for negotiating on these matters. We 
then evaluate other approaches, including what realistically could be possible if a new body 
specifically created for global negotiation in the area were to be used. 
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Prior to 1913, visas were not required for transit between most countries, and work
permits were also not required for employment of foreigners. Passports were largely
used as proof of identity and/or citizenship once inside national borders in case help
were needed, typically from an embassy or ambassador abroad. Border formalities
focused on revenue collection via tariﬀs from those crossing borders with goods in
transit, not on documentary proof of identity.
Today, in our allegedly globalized world, individuals crossing borders not only
need passports, but also often visas and work permits and obtaining them can involve
documentary requirements that depending on the case, can take months and even
years to assemble. The web has many stories of delays and bureaucratic complexity
and a wide range of problems are identiﬁed, including escalating visa fees, delays in
issuance, randomness in decisions, the need for transit visas, collateral (add-on) costs
(such as added costs to airlines), photographic and medical requirements for issuance,
bureaucratic impediments,1 and the use in some countries of visas as an ineﬃcient tax
mechanism.
Here, we discuss how global negotiations aimed at mitigating some of these eﬀects
might proceed, noting the security concerns that have intensiﬁed their severity in the
last few years. One approach is to primarily seek remedy within the present global
institutional structure embodied in existing arrangements and organizations such as
WTO, regional economic partnership agreements,2 other structures not formed specif-
ically to address these problems but to which these issues might be brought. Another
is to use a new specially designed problem-oriented visa/work permit international
negotiating entity, separate from existing bodies. This would add to the many other
international bodies which already exist, and may be viewed as unattractive on these
grounds; but it could also facilitate some forward progress by taking problems directly.
While it is possible to use the two approaches simultaneously, coordination across the
two would clearly be an issue, and we assume for our discussion the issue is which one
might predominate.
1Some countries are now requiring dental records for some types of visas.
2See Dayaratna Banda and Whalley (2005) for a discussion of how movement of persons has been
dealt in recent ASEAN blocwide and individual country regional trade and economic partnership
agreements.
2The negative of using existing organizational forms for visas and work permit
problems (such as the WTO) is that any discussions within these organization would
of necessity have to ﬁt into a preexisting structure and the focus of these entities
may not ﬁt the issues at stake. The WTO, for instance, stresses non-discrimination
while most visa practices are highly discriminatory and will likely remain so. The
WTO focuses on bindings and reductions in trade barriers, and less on removing
unnecessary bureaucratic impediments which are speciﬁc to visas and work permits.
A new entity would be an issue speciﬁc entity specially designed for dealing with issues
in the area. The positives of using existing organizations are the savings in set up and
initial transaction costs as institutions evolve, and the possibility that negotiations
on visa and work permit problems might be speeded by cross bargaining with other
issues (and vice versa) in such forma as the WTO. The negatives are the need to force
visa and work permit issues into a preexisting non-visa and work permit negotiating
format, and the acceptance of the timetable and rate of progress on other issues in the
body chosen. We discuss all of these and other considerations involved in formulating
a general approach.
We discuss recent proposals made in the GATS in the WTO by India for a special
and new GATS Visa system which would provide an additional avenue for dealing with
visa issues beyond current procedures. The two weaknesses we see for this proposal
are ﬁrstly that OECD countries will likely not be accommodating, and secondly that it
does not centrally confront the many problems which exist in day to day administrative
practice with these instruments. Bringing visas and work permits into the GATS, as
has been suggested in these proposals under Mode 4 of the GATS, will also bring
another non-trade global economic issue to the WTO and further broaden the WTO
as a global multi-issue beyond trade entity. We also suggest that the WTO/GATS may
not be the best venue for visa/work permit negotiating activity since the preexisting
GATS structure does not ﬁt well the issues to be discussed.
We also discuss what a new global negotiating entity on visas and work permits
might look like and what it could realistically achieve. A start could be eﬀorts to cod-
ify country based visa and work permit practices and move toward a more common
internationally agreed structure. More transparency could be introduced into coun-
try practices through an annual World Visa/Work Permit Report. We also discuss a
possible investigative role for such a body in attempting to identify non-security and
3seeming ineﬃcient national practices, such as the use of visas for revenue raising. Such
elements could perhaps be replaced by more eﬃcient tax instruments. Also, the ex-
ploitative use of visas and work permits, say where a national government visa issuing
agency requires purchase of insurance by travelers from an agency or company they
control could also be investigated. Potentially, such practices could be mutually agreed
to be eliminated. Finally, where visa retaliation is occurring, an international body
might help in identifying such instances, and proposing cooperative improvements.
Despite all the current popular concern over the visa and work permit situation,
we have been able to ﬁnd relatively little academic research on the impact of these
instruments on the global economy. We therefore ﬁrst classify some of the problems
which current visa and work permit practices around the world seemingly create.
Our list includes cumbersome and costly application procedures (form completion,
document collection, photo and medical examination requirements, application fees
and legal fees for notarizing documents), lengthy processing times and delays, complex
bureaucratic and administrative processes (multiple assessment stages, interviews),
rejection of application and costs of reapplying, quantitative limits on visa and work
permits, and strict eligibility conditions for visa and work permit applications.
We also provide some speculative calculations as to possible ranges for the potential
global costs that this system of restrictions on global labour ﬂows produces by drawing
on earlier literature on the global costs of misallocation of labour across countries
which visa and work permit arrangements in part support, and making some new
calculations of our own. Data and information on these restrictions are surprisingly
sparse, with only anecdotal information available on some elements, and fragments of
data (such as on rejection rates for some countries) or others. Available information
largely relate to the number of border crossings and the fees and average time required
for processing visa applications by country. We use a series of simple assumptions and
utilize available information in some simple calculations which provide some indicative
global cost estimates for visa and work permit practices. We suggest the global costs
could well be large.
In an era of globalization we often think that we are moving remorselessly to an
ever more globalized world economy. This may be true of goods and capital ﬂows,
but labour movement across national borders seemingly becomes ever more restricted.
Current visa and work permit restrictions which now apply to both long term and
4short term movement of labour cover both inter OECD and OECD and non-OECD
movement of labour. While current eﬀorts to provide partial remedy in the current
situation have centred thus far on the GATS Mode 4 discussions in WTO, we suggest
that another route to explore maybe a new global negotiating entity speciﬁcally focused
on these issues.
52 How Visas and Work Permits Restrict Global Labour
Mobility
A visa confers a right on a foreigner to enter a host country for a speciﬁed time period.
Usually, there are conditions attached to this right when granted, including time limits,
restrictions on employment without authorization, registration with local police, and
others. A work permit provides a worker entering a host country authorization to take
up paid employment. Once again, conditions also apply including time limits, limits on
the authorization to particular employers, and other restrictions. Most countries have
separate visa and work permit systems, but a small number of countries (including
the US) link work permits and visas in a single combined authorization. It is common
to use two separate evaluation and issuance procedures with work permits sometimes
being issued after arrival and visa entry has occurred.
A wide range of types of visas and work permits characterize country systems
depending on the length (or permanence) of stay, the purpose of visit, and other
characteristics. Tourism, study and business visits typically only require a visa. Most
visas do not entitle foreigners to enter paid employment in the local labour market.
The form that visas and work permits take (types of visa/work permits, length
of stay) vary, application procedures (forms, informational and documentary require-
ments, selection criteria, fees) vary, as do administrative procedures (methods of assess-
ment, how veriﬁcation of documents occurs, arrangements for interviews, processing
time). Decision rules on issuance also vary with various country speciﬁc legal struc-
tures and administrative rules as well as qualitative and quantitative restrictions on
issuance, as well as diﬀering rules on how permanent residency can be attained.
Transparency in procedures is another issue. These include status inquiry proce-
dures, notiﬁcations of delays, and how enquiries as to grounds for rejections are dealt
with. Further issues arise with visa and work permit exemption and waiver programs
which vary from country to country and from region to region. Most OECD countries,
for instance, have reciprocal agreements on visa exemption for short-term visits to and
from each other. Regional trade and economic partnership agreements also cover some
visa and work permit exemptions for temporary and speciﬁc labour movement.3
3Examples are the EEA, EFTA, COMESA, NAFTA. For more detailed discussion on these, see
62.1 Application Procedures
Application procedures for visas and work permits are often cumbersome and costly.
A person wishing to apply for a visa or work permit must ﬁrst obtain an application
package. Each country embassy and consular oﬃce will typically have diﬀerent ap-
plication forms and requirements for the various types of visa and work permits they
require and most enquiries can only be handled by mail or by telephone, often with
a lengthy waiting time.4 If application forms cannot easily be downloaded from the
web, a person has to write to the embassy and consular oﬃce and it may take weeks
for the oﬃce to send out an application package.
Application procedures not only require ﬁlling in forms, but also collecting docu-
ments for photocopying and attaching to the application (e.g. proof of qualiﬁcation,
work experience, reference letters), taking and attaching photographs, visiting banks
to buy foreign-currency bank drafts (since often credit cards are not accepted). Where
certiﬁed documents and medical reports are needed, legal fees are incurred in nota-
Nielson (2002). See also Dayaratna Banda and Whalley (2005) for a discussion of these arrangements
involving ASEAN countries.
4The following examples of issues with procedures involved in obtaining visas for business purposes
were given in recent testimony of Randel K. Johnson, vice president of Labour, Immigration and
Employee Beneﬁts of the US Chamber of Commerce before the House Committee on Government
Reform Hearing on the Impact of Visa Delays on Businesses (July 10, 2003):
• The Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce recently wrote to the US Department of State
pointing out that visa applicants in Switzerland calling the toll line to set up appointments often
spend over 30 minutes on the phone (at $1.50/minute) and the wait time for an appointment
in Bern is currently 8 weeks and growing.
• The American Chamber of Commerce in Korea estimates that new US visa interview require-
ments mean an approximate six-month wait for an appointment. The average U.S. airline ticket
from Korea is purchased three weeks before travel.
• In the Czech Republic, visa applicants must call a toll number to arrange an appointment at
the consulate, and where those callers are often put on hold and given visa interview dates long
after the expected date of departure (even when the caller has called weeks in advance of the
trip). One airline estimated a loss of over $100,000 in the last several months due to cancelled
travel plans.
• In South Africa, new interview requirements in the US embassy often require a domestic trip of
several hours travel time or a ﬂight to obtain a visa, even before traveling to the United States,
adding additional cost and time out of the oﬃce.
7rizing the relevant documents and there may be extra costs for medical examinations.
All these requirements not only lengthen the application time they also increase costs
to the applicant.
In addition, if an employer applies for a work permit authorization on behalf of a
foreign worker, typical work permit procedures require details to be provided about the
employer, the nature of the job, what eﬀorts have been made to ﬁnd local personnel
and evidence of failure to do so, details of the candidate’s experience, skills, and
training, and veriﬁcation of personal details. The ﬁling process may take weeks or
months. Long and complex procedures increase costs to host employers and can oﬀset
the beneﬁt of hiring foreign workers, which in turn creates further barriers to cross
border labour mobility.5
2.2 Bureaucratic and Administrative Processing Procedures
The processing of visa and work permit applications can also involve complex bu-
reaucratic and administrative procedures.6 Personnel make initial assessments of ap-
plications, which may include checking if application forms are completed, relevant
5US agencies tasked with approving visas for visiting scientists have in recent years characterize
policy in terms of ”secure borders and open doors”, but new regulations and added layers of bureau-
cracy have added to delays in processing visas. A recent report from the Government Accounting
Oﬃce (GAO) discussed the scientist community’s concern over delays. The GAO report emphasized
that whether or not an applicant had to undergo a security check for those engaged in sensitive tech-
nologies, known as ”Mantis,” was a major determinant of the length of time it takes to process visas
[Bioscience, Apr2004, Vol.54, Issue 4, pp.296]. Congressional Testimony of Ms. Palma R. Yanni, Pres-
ident Elect, America Immigration Lawyers Association, illustrates some of the problems which can
arise: ”In March a physician who is practicing with a small hospital in a rural, medically underserved
area went home to Central America for a brief vacation. He was trained in the United States, had
received multiple previous visas, and had a security check done both by BCIS and the Department of
State prior to the approval of his change of status to H. When he went to the U.S. consulate to obtain
a new visa he was told there was an identiﬁer on his name, albeit with a diﬀerent birth date, and he
had to be ﬁngerprinted and wait for the FBI to clear him before the visa was issued. The process took
60 days, and the community struggled without this desperately needed physician.” [Congressional
Testimony by President Elect, America Immigration Lawyers Association Committee on House Small
Business, June 4, 2003]
6All nonimmigrant visa applicants who wish to come to the United States to study, teach, research,
or engage in business in various scientiﬁc and technical ﬁelds, for example, in sensors and sensor
technology, marine technology, and remote sensing, imaging, and reconnaissance, are subject to a
Mantis background check by the FBI if a State Department consular oﬃcer requests one. Problems
8documents are attached and notarized, photographs are of speciﬁc size and other re-
quirements are met, payment has been made and the bank draft is valid, and a medical
report has been received. If any of the above are not met, oﬃce personnel have to
write to the applicant to ask for further information. This can involve further admin-
istrative cost and time delays. After the initial assessment is completed, the same (or
other) personnel may schedule an appointment with the applicant for an interview,
involving time to prepare, conduct and assess.
Other personnel (from consular oﬃces or other governmental agencies) may be
called upon to verify documents and assess applications. In several countries, the
ﬁnal discussion on visa issuance requires a security check by the respective national
security oﬃce. This can involve additional complex bureaucratic process involving
the immigration department, the police oﬃce and other governmental agencies or
departments. In most countries, applicants for temporary work permits or permanent
residency have to provide evidence of absence of criminal record in all countries they
have resided in. They may have to apply for police certiﬁcates from diﬀerent countries.
Each country will have diﬀerent administrative procedures and the result may be
further lengthy processing and delay.
2.3 Processing Times and Delay
While stated oﬃcial processing times for visa/work permit applications may seem
be short (1-5 business days, see Table 1 for details), anecdotal information suggests
time delays are common and processing times commonly range from 2 weeks to over 3
months. Recent tightening of visa/work permit approval procedures in some countries,
such as US, has resulted in time delays of up to 6 months.7 Delays are often attributed
to complex bureaucratic procedures such as security checks by various governmental
with the process can cause delays in resolving Mantis requests, including improperly formatted requests
and uncertainty by consular staﬀ at posts as to when they should apply Mantis checks. The GAO
found that it takes an average of 67 days to approve a visa through the Mantis process. For applicants
from China, India, and Russia, the wait is generally longer. [Bioscience, Apr2004, Vol.54, Issue 4,
pp.296]
7The Director-General of the Russian news service ITAR-TASS indicated that Russian journalists
applying for visas in the West wait an average of three to ﬁve months and sometimes as long as 18
months. They are often required to provide irrelevant dental records, notarized certiﬁcates and other
documents. [Editor & Publisher, 5/28/94, Vol. 127, Issue 22, pp.15-16]
9agencies, interview requirements, and backlogs of reapplications due to previous rejec-
tions.8
2.4 Quantitative Limits on Visa/Work Permits
National security and other considerations such as assimilation problems in local labour
market also result in most host countries imposing quantitative limits on the granting
of certain types of visas and work permits over a speciﬁc period of time. For example,
in US, there are annual quotas for the number of H-1B visas issued (for temporary
employment). The timing of application of such quotas is a major issue. For instance,
the US quotas generally commence in October of each year, but are normally exhausted
within a few months. Host employers who wish to hire foreign employees then have to
wait until the next October, when the new quota allocation round begins. During the
year, host employers have to look for local higher-paid workers or even reduce some
business activities.
2.5 Rejection of Application and Costs of Reapplying
Given both quantitative limits on visas and work permits and large numbers of applica-
tions, it is also common for applications to be rejected. In US, for instance, the Bureau
of Consular Aﬀairs at the Department of State reports that the annual rejection rate
for tourist and business visas has been as high as 30%. There are no available statis-
tics for rejection rates for work permits or permanent residency applications, but it is
generally believed that rejection rates for such applications are much higher. Frequent
rejection of applications increases the number of reapplications, and delays increase as
reevaluation procedures recommence. Each new application goes through its own new
8A recent survey of US visa applicants revealed that the number of students whose start dates
were delayed by visa problems was 48% higher in 2003 than at the start of the previous academic
year. For scholars - a broad category dominated by young postdoctoral researchers - the increase
was 76%. More than three-quarters of the delayed students were in the physical sciences, biological
sciences or engineering. Among scholars, these disciplines accounted for 93% of those who experienced
signiﬁcant delays. Other sources paint a similar picture. Last July, the American Institute of Physics
reported that nearly a quarter of foreign students who applied to study towards a PhD in physics in
the United States in 2002 were initially denied a visa. According to Wendy White, director of the
Board on International Scientiﬁc Organizations at the US National Academies, ”For the scientists we
hear from, the average wait time is still over ﬁve months”. [Nature, Vol 427, 15 January 2004]
10evaluation with eligibility conditions for application, once again with similar applica-
tion procedures, bureaucratic and administrative processes, lengthy processing time
and further delays. Another round of rejection and reapplication is then also possible.
2.6 Eligibility for Visa and Work Permits
A further set of issues concerns eligibility for visas and work permits.9 Countries that
impose work permit requirements for employment on foreign workers require foreign
workers to have valid work permits issued by host countries in order to engage in
local employment, and it is common for host employers to ﬁle documents on behalf
of foreign workers. There are, however, legal requirements in many countries that
mandate that employers must meet speciﬁc preconditions before ﬁling for work permits
on behalf of prospective employees. These include providing evidence of an extensive
search for local personnel before hiring a foreign worker, stringent advertising and
search requirements, and demonstration of the infeasibility of training local people.
Only after these conditions are met can local employers then submit a work permit
application for a foreign worker. Such eligibility conditions can be found in the US,
UK and other EEA countries.
Eligibility conditions in host countries also often generate an inherent bias in the
system against middle and lower level overseas workers in the way work permit pro-
cesses work. Under tiered systems of work permit application processing used in many
OECD countries, applications that are ﬁled for higher level personnel such as directors,
senior executives, and intra company transfers are easier to obtain than permits for
personnel such as systems analysts and database consultants. The common perception
seems to be that higher level managerial foreign staﬀ raise the competitiveness of host
countries without signiﬁcant displacement eﬀects in the local markets, while entry of
foreign trained middle and lower level staﬀ displace local labour.
9This section is mainly based on the paper by Chanda (1999).
113 The Costs of Visa and Work Permit Restrictions
To place the previous discussion of visa and work permit problems in a broader context
as it relates to the overall performance of the global economy, we next provide some
speculative estimates of the potential eﬃciency costs that current visa/work permit
requirements both create and support. We discuss these costs in two diﬀerent cate-
gories. One involves resource misallocation costs which result from labour not being
able to locate in its most productive use. The other reﬂects private and public ad-
ministrative, delay and other costs that are incurred to meet visa/work permit issuing
requirements.
3.1 Misallocation of Labor Across Countries
Several studies attempt to quantify the resource misallocation costs of global restric-
tions on labor mobility and visa and work permit restrictions support the resulting
misallocation by restraining labour that would otherwise move between countries. In
general these studies suggest large worldwide eﬃciency/output costs from labor mo-
bility (visa/work permit) restrictions. These studies begin with the assertion that the
marginal product of labor in high-income countries is substantially higher than that in
low-income countries, typically due to larger amounts of capital and infrastructure in
these rich countries. Thus a worker moving from a low-income to a high-income coun-
try becomes more productive as long as other workers are restricted in their mobility.
Given that there are large diﬀerences in output per worker between high-income de-
veloped and low-income developing countries and there is relatively more labor in the
latter, the equalization of real wages under elimination of cross country labor mobility
restrictions typically leads to large global eﬃciency and output gains.10
One of the earliest pieces in this literature is Hamilton and Whalley (1984) who
found large output gains from liberalizing global labor mobility up to the point that
marginal value products of labor are equalized across countries or regions. Under
assumptions of ﬁxed world labour supply and global full employment, they estimated
10These studies abstract from potential costs of emigration for source countries (e.g. brain drain)
and costs of immigration to host countries (e.g. assimilation costs, ﬁscal burden of immigration,
congestion), as well as network and other externalities involved with the cross-border movement of
labour.
12annual global gains from eliminating all visa and work permit restrictions to be in
the range of 60%-200% of Gross World Product in 1977. They also estimated the
distributional implications of global free movement of labour. Assuming that capital
was immobile across countries, they found that capital owners (workers) in labour
importing regions were made better oﬀ (worse oﬀ) in most cases while the opposite
occurred in labour exporting regions.
Winters et al (2002) use a similar approach to assess the global impacts of liber-
alization under Mode 4 GATS restrictions of service provider mobility. They ﬁnd out
that increasing developed country quotas for incoming temporary movement of natural
persons (TMNP) by 3% of the existing labour force in receiving countries would gen-
erate global income gains of $150 billion/year, suggesting large gains even from only
a small increase in the allowable movement of people between low and high income
countries. In a related piece, Winters (2001) assumed that when workers move from
low to high income countries only one quarter of the productivity diﬀerence is returned
as a higher wage, and under this assumption global gains from free labour movement
are smaller (about US$300 billion per year), but still larger than current estimates of
the gains from global WTO liberalization of both goods and services (about US$260
billion estimated by Dee and Hanslow (2000)).
In a later piece, Iregui (2003) employs a multi-region static numerical general
equilibrium model with an assumption of segmented labour markets for skilled and
unskilled workers to analyze the costs of global labour market segmentation. She also
reports large worldwide eﬃciency gains from liberalizing the global movement of both
skilled and unskilled labour, ranging from 15%-67% of world GDP. When only free
mobility of skilled labour is allowed, global gains are smaller since in most developing
regions the skilled labour only represents a small fraction of their total labour force.
In addition, the income distribution eﬀects in lower income countries are adverse since
low wage unskilled labour is assumed immobile across countries.
More recently, Klein and Ventura (2004) use a dynamic inter-country model with
capital accumulation and allow capital mobility across regions and also quantify the
impacts of removing labor migration restrictions. They use their model both to assess
the impacts of enlargement of the European Union and a hypothetical removal of
migration restrictions between OECD and non-OECD countries at the same time.
They ﬁnd that lifting EU immigration restrictions on enlargement would increase the
13long run output of the enlarged EU by 8%. They report large increases in world output
in the long run of between 94% and 172% of Gross World Product after liberalization
of labour mobility restrictions between OECD and non-OECD countries.
The indications from all of these studies are that visas and work permits which
restrict the free ﬂow of labour across national borders impose large costs on the global
economy by supporting a misallocation of labour spatially around the world. These
misallocation costs are separate from bureaucratic delays and the administrative and
processing costs of visa and work permit to which we now turn.
3.2 Some Estimates of the Costs of Visa/Work Permit Processing
The processing and other costs of administering and operating visas and work permit
schemes are in addition to the resource misallocation costs from spatial restrictions
on global labour mobility. These embody both a private and public component. A
person wishing to travel abroad has to apply for a visa/work permit in advance and the
respective authority (e.g. embassy/consular oﬃce) has to process the application. It is
common to experience a time delay in processing or the application can be rejected. We
divide the costs involved into (1) application costs (application fees, visits/interviews,
form completion, photo requirements); (2) processing costs (administrative/personnel
cost); (3) possible delay costs; (4) add-on costs (reapplication costs due to rejection,
airline processing).
3.2.1 Application Costs
Visa/work permit application fees around the world (see Table 1) are nontrivial. Ap-
plication fees diﬀer from country to country, by type of visa (tourist or business visas,
study or work permits), by length of visa (short-term or long-term), entry frequency
(single or multiple entry) and even processing time (from 3-day to 25-day). A number
of East Asian countries (e.g. Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea)
impose relatively low application fees (less than US$50). In contrast, a number of
lower income developing countries such as South Asian, African, Mid-East, and for-
mer centrally planned European countries impose high application fees (from US$40
to US$285). In some countries, visa application fees seemingly provide tax revenue.
For example, in Russia and Kenya, the same type of visa but with diﬀerent process-
ing time can have diﬀerent application fees, and in some cases, the diﬀerences can be
1450-100%.
In assessing application costs, it is important to note that there are visa exemptions
for a signiﬁcant portion of short-term visitors around the world. In general, most high-
income countries (including most OECD countries) oﬀer visa exemptions on short-term
(from 14-180 days) tourist and business visits for visitors from most OECD and high-
income countries, while few or even no visa exemptions are granted to most low-income
developing countries. In seemingly reciprocity, several low-income developing countries
do not grant visa exemptions to residents of high-income countries.
In addition to application fees, many embassy or consular oﬃces require personal
interviews when assessing applications. In countries where embassy or consular oﬃces
are located only in speciﬁc areas, applicants incur transport costs and may have to
make a domestic overnight trip in order to attend interviews. Transportation costs in-
crease further if reapplication occurs due to rejection (seemingly common in practice).
3.2.2 Processing Costs
Costs are also imposed on government agencies or authorities responsible for the pro-
cessing of visa/work permit applications, and these also involve administrative and
personnel costs. While there are seemingly no available hard data, most visa/work
permit applications require personal interviews at respective embassy or consular of-
ﬁces. These interviews involve personnel costs in addition to the paperwork required
for processing applications. Rejection of applications and time delays impose extra
costs from reapplication and dealing with backlogs of applications due to time delays.
Some visa/work permit applications have to be cleared by several diﬀerent govern-
mental agencies.11 Currently in the US, for example, some visa/work permit applica-
tions (especially those related to a ”technology alert list”) need to go through complex
11The Russian visa system is often reputed to be problematic on this score. Since the impact of
ﬁnancial crises in Russia has been that government oﬃcials sometimes charge for their ”services”. For
Western European visitors, oﬃcial invitations are needed from either a tourist company or a business
partner or other registered organization including proof that every night’s accommodation has been
paid in advance. In principle these invitations cost nothing but reports from Moscow and Novosibirsk
suggest that it is diﬃcult to get the oﬃcial stamp in Moscow without paying about 50 dollars per
invitation. This process can be slow and unreliable by post. [see Report of the Climate Train - Journey
by train and boat from Europe to the UN Climate Convention in Kyoto, November - December 1997:
”Bureaucratic barriers to sustainable travel”]
15security checks which include extra consular scrutiny and review by other agencies
(e.g. top FBI).
3.2.3 Delay Costs
While oﬃcial processing times for visa/work permit applications are claimed by gov-
ernment agencies around the world to be short (1-5 business days, see Table 1), it
is seemingly common to experience longer delays.12 Delays sometimes are attributed
to complex bureaucratic procedures involving security checks by various governmen-
tal agencies, interview requirements, and a backlog of reapplications due to previous
rejection.13 Where international trade and businesses require frequent and on-time
international travel, such time delays lead to losses in business opportunities.
3.2.4 Add-on Costs
Given that rejection of visa and work permit applications is common in practice, the
costs of a successful application often include other add-on costs. Airlines incur extra
personnel costs in checking the validity of visa/work permits and complying with
conﬂicting transit rules between borders. For instance, all carriers operating ﬂights to,
from or through the US are required to provide customs and immigration oﬃcials with
access to data on individual passengers. Airlines face ﬁnes of $1000 for violations of
requirements of a passenger by US immigration and $5000 a passenger by customs. To
complicate matters further, legislation in the EU means that airlines also face potential
ﬁnes and civil damages for breaching data protection laws that, among other things,
prohibit the transfer of personal data to countries which are not considered to oﬀer
adequate protection - such as the US.
12As noted earlier, anecdotal evidence suggests that time delays range from 2 weeks to over 3
months. With the recent tightening in the visa/work permit approval process in some countries due
to security concerns, such as in the US, time delays can be up to 6 months.
13Reports from Russia indicate that concerns over an illegal inﬂux of people have caused the Russian
authorities to remedy what they see as abuse of the system. According to the Russia Journal (10
September 2003), for almost months, foreign executives, investors and business associations have been
”shouting themselves hoarse” over the ”mess” the Russian visa system is in and the Russian Journal
claims no one seems to be listening. Russian visas are some of the most expensive in the world, and
require a complicated system of invitations, supporting documentation, accreditations, applications
and registrations. Brokers can often obtain a one-year business visa in four to six weeks but at a cost.
163.2.5 Some Speculative Estimates of Visa/Work Permit Processing Costs
Using available data and the anecdotal information we have gathered on worldwide
visa/work permit application fees, time delays, and tourism statistics from World
Tourism Organization, we have made some simple speculative calculations as to the
possible size of the processing costs involved globally. We do not claim a precise
estimate given the complexity of restrictions around the world and the limitations of
data, and these estimates are only broadly indicative.
We ﬁrst make up the conservative assumption that only 25% of actual travelers
globally need to apply for a visa/work permit.14 We also assume that on average
that the application fee is US$100 and other application costs amount to US$50 (e.g.
transportation cost for attending interview). We assume time delays of 14 days and a
modest the daily opportunity cost of time involved in the delay of US$25.15 Accord-
ing to the World Tourism Organization, there were 703 million international tourist
arrivals around the world in 2000. Most of these arrivals are from high-income coun-
tries and visa exemptions apply in most of these countries. Using this ﬁgure, these
assumptions yield total worldwide costs of processing visa/work permit applications
of US$88 billion or around 0.3% of World GDP.
Further costs arise from the losses of tourism and business opportunities that re-
quire international travel (e.g. contract negotiation, business exhibition, site and prod-
uct inspection, after-sale customer services).
Worldwide tourism statistics indicate that mobility restrictions are still binding in
most countries and regions even though there are various regional trade arrangements
that partially liberalize bilateral labour ﬂows (e.g. EEA, EFTA, NAFTA, AFTA,
APEC). During the last decade, worldwide international tourist arrivals were equal to
about 10% of the total world population, despite substantial declines in transportation
costs. The market share of international tourist arrivals is heavily biased towards
the OECD countries, with European and North American residents accounting for
about 70% of the total. Data from the World Tourism Organization allow us to
14This diﬀers sharply from potential travelers, and the 25% ﬁgure reﬂects tourist visits involving
OECD citizens.
15This includes foregone higher income in the recipient country, plus time devoted to resolving the
delay.
17produce speculative estimates of the potential gain in tourism revenue from relaxing
current mobility restrictions. In 2002, worldwide international tourist arrivals were 703
millions (or 11% of world population), and corresponding world tourism receipts were
US$474 billion (or 1.5% of world GDP). On average, each international tourist arrival
spent US$674 per trip. If eliminating current visa/work permit requirements were
to raise worldwide international tourist arrivals, to say, 20% of the world population,
using the data in 2002, the increase in tourism revenue will be US$388 billion or 1.2%
of world GDP. This is not a global eﬃciency gain, but under these assumptions the
output impact for the tourist industry could be substantial.
Losses of business opportunities due to visa/work permit problems are hard to
quantify, but short to medium term business visits across countries are typically a cen-
tral component in maintaining ongoing international businesses and creating new busi-
ness opportunities. Each year, there are numerous business exhibitions/conferences
around the world that bring together potential buyers and sellers for diﬀerent business
opportunities, and multinational corporations often require employees to travel be-
tween countries for various business activities. International businesses often require
counterparts from diﬀerent countries or regions to meet in person for contract negoti-
ation, site/product inspection and after-sale customer service. In such an integrated
world, barriers to free movement of persons increase transportation and transactions
costs, which in turn lead to potential losses from forgone business opportunities. There
are seemingly no available data or analytical framework for measuring the impacts of
restrictions on business travel, but many anecdotal pieces discuss these problems and
suggest substantial costs.16
16The following are extracts from press reports illustrating how business sectors report themselves
as being aﬀected by recent tightening US visa/work permit issuance procedures:
• In a recent letter to Colin Powell, US secretary of state, and Tom Ridge, head of the Department
of Homeland Security, 80 business organisations warned: ”The severe delays and uncertainty
surrounding visa issuance for legitimate applicants has resulted in lost business opportunities for
US companies, delayed projects or movement of projects abroad, loss of jobs in some industries,
workforce shortages and other economic stresses.” [Financial Times, London (UK), Apr 9, 2003,
pp. 16]
• Long delays in issuing visas have ensnared scores of Chinese business delegations heading to
the U.S. as applications submitted in China wend their way through new security checks in
Washington. Overall, billions of dollars in business contracts are imperiled as a result of the
delays, which many corporate oﬃcials had predicted at the time the new immigration rules
18were adopted. The problem is not only limited to China but high-technology experts from
India, Russia and even Silicon Valley have been having diﬃculty obtaining visas. [Wall Street
Journal, (Eastern edition), New York, Dec 9, 2003, pp. A1]
• A chief representative in China for Rockwell Automation Inc., Mr. Byrnes, complained that
because of the visa complications, his company has not been able to get potential customers
to American trade shows or to train some Chinese employees in the U.S. ”The visa policies are
putting U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage,” he said. [Wall Street Journal. (Eastern
edition), New York, Dec 9, 2003, pp. A1]
• Some companies have had diﬃculty dealing with the additional delays due to the increased
security checks under the so-called ”Visa Condor” program. For example, a petroleum en-
gineering company based in Texas has had diﬃculty in obtaining visas for project managers
from its client, the Saudi national oil company, Saudi ARAMCO. ARAMCO has told them
that they are going to start looking at contractors in the United Kingdom and other countries,
potentially costing this US company millions in revenue, and jeopardizing over 2,000 U.S. jobs.
[US Chamber of Commerce testimony on the Impact of Visa Delays on Businesses - July 10,
2003]
• Amway Corp., one of the world’s largest direct-sale ﬁrms, ruled out Los Angeles and Hawaii
as possible convention sites for 8,000 South Korean distributors next year, in the face of a
requirement that they all complete face-to-face interviews with U.S. consular oﬃcials. The
convention is to be held in Japan. Amway estimates the distributors would have spent an
average $1,250 per person on U.S. airlines, hotels and shops, meaning a loss of more than $10
million for the would-be host city. [”Visa Delays Irk U.S. Science, Industry, Academia”, The
Wall Street Journal Europe, 12 November 2003]
• Ingersoll-Rand Co., a multinational corporation with $9.6 billion in annual sales and 50,000
employees world-wide, has been waiting for nearly two months to ship a $2.5 million compressor
to an energy concern in Sichuan province in China. The hang-up: getting visas for ﬁve Chinese
engineers and an interpreter for a one-week inspection visit. [”Visa Delays Irk U.S. Science,
Industry, Academia”, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 12 November 2003]
• Visa screenings are making it harder for foreign visitors to come to U.S. trade shows, costing
money to cities that are major convention destinations. At the Consumer Electronics Asso-
ciation show in January in Las Vegas, 2,000 of the 16,000 foreign participants were missing
because they could not get visas in time. [Tribune Business News, 4 August 2003]
• An Ingersoll-Rand unit had to delay moving manufacturing to the USA from the United King-
dom by two months because of visa delays. Executives in London who are leading the move
had to wait about six weeks for interviews. Visa processing in London used to take ﬁve to seven
business days. [USA Today, 1 August 2003]
• ”It’s too soon to know the dollar amount for lost business,” says Theresa Brown, director of
immigration policy at the US Chamber of Commerce. ”But we can infer some of this stuﬀ.
International travel to the US is an Dollars 80bn a year industry. Visa delays are contributing
to a potential loss in business”. [Financial Times, London (UK), Apr 9, 2003, pp.16]
194 Global Negotiations To Mitigate the Eﬀects of Visas
and Work Permits
Given both the seeming severity of the problems caused by current visa and work
permit restrictions and the associated costs to the global economy, an obvious question
to ask is whether there is a global international negotiation which could help mitigate
their impacts. Key questions are what should be the cum of such negotiations, who
the parties should be, and whether such global negotiations could or should take place
under the auspices of an existing international body, such as the WTO, or whether a
new entity to be created.
4.1 Using the WTO or Other Existing Organizations
One of the beneﬁts of using existing organizations for negotiations on visas and work
permits is the saving in transactions and organizational costs relative to attempting
to negotiate in a new body since establishing new entities takes time. Since working
arrangements in existing organizations are already established, the need for these to
be developed prior to negotiating adds to the costs of using new entities. The WTO,
for instance, has long been the global venue for global trade discussions both through
trade negotiating rounds now covering both goods and services, and in resolving trade
disputes through dispute settlement dealing with the interpretation of existing agree-
• While few disagree with the need for greater screening, some business groups say the changes
present a new hurdle for the U.S. travel industry and corporations when they can ill aﬀord it.
Since 2001, the peak year for visa applications, the number has dropped 20% to 8.3 million last
year. [USA Today, 1 August 2003]
• Visa delays are hurting a once-booming international medical business in US. Hospitals are
seeing a continued weakness in international- patient numbers, including a 23 % drop at the
world-famous Mayo Clinic since 2001. The application used to be a 24-hour process but is now
routinely a 3-week wait, says Stephen Gudgell, head of the clinic’s international program. He
notes that competitors in other countries, including Germany, are capitalizing on US newly
cumbersome process. They are able to guarantee medical visas in 24 hours. He recalls a young
Middle Eastern male - the kind the State Department would watch carefully - who wanted
cardiac surgery at Mayo. But rather than waiting three to four weeks for a visa, he went to
Germany. ”Those situations occur on a regular basis,” Mr Gudgell says. [Christian Science
Monitor, 30 July 2003]
20ments. The WTO has broadened its coverage to cover non-trade issues and could be
similarly broadened to cover visa and work permits.
While at ﬁrst sight seemingly attractive, the negative of using existing organiza-
tional forms is this way is that such negotiations would have to be ﬁtted into the
preexisting structure and focus of these entities, which may not ﬁt the visa and work
permit issues well. The WTO, for instance, stresses non-discrimination in trade and
other policies while most visa/work permit practices are highly and inherently dis-
criminatory. It is also a multilateral entity requiring unanimity of member countries
on any agreed disciplines. Country to Country negotiation on, say, numerical limits on
bilateral entry types is hard to envisage in a WTO format. These types of clashes will
be encountered if the WTO is used as the negotiating venue, but can be side stepped
if a new entity is used.
A potential beneﬁt that can be reasonably claimed for using existing institutional
structures to negotiate on labor mobility restrictions is the possibility of speeding
negotiations on visas and work permits by allowing for by cross bargaining on other
issues in bodies such as the WTO. A related beneﬁt that could be claimed is possible
progress on other issues being speeded by allowing visas and work permits to be added
to the global bargaining mix. In the WTO Urgurary Round it was repeatedly claimed
that broadening bargains in this way speeds negotiating progress, and the same claim
can be made of visas and work permits. But in the same Round the complexity of
the issues involved in each area itself at times impeded simultaneous bargaining at
the same time. One cannot dispute that potentially beneﬁts might arise from more
centrally bringing visas and work permits into the WTO framework, but the issue
needs to be approached realistically and carefully. Other forums such as ILO and the
OECD, do not directly deal with visa and work permit issues, and they are not also
negotiating forums.
4.2 The GATS Visa Proposal
A proposal made in the GATS WTO by India is for the establishment of a special and
new GATS Visa system.17 These proposals for discussing visas in the WTO current
GATS only focus on visas and not on work permits, and only on Mode 4 services trade,
not global labour mobility restrictions in general. While it may be possible to use the
17For more details about this proposal, see Chanda (1999).
21existing framework of the GATS to discuss more general visa/work permit practice
issues, the reality seem to be that it may prove diﬃcult and that may be in part due
to inherent weaknesses of the GATS (such as its negative list approach).
India has proposed that a new and separate class of visas ”GATS Visa” be cre-
ated for service professionals temporarily working overseas in order to facilitate the
movement of people under Service Supply Mode 4.18 The proposal is that a new
supplementary visa structure common to all countries be created involving standard
application and administrative processes and other formalities and mechanisms, so that
there would be a codiﬁcation/standardization of new visas among member countries.
The idea is to create a wholly new channel of visa issuance with more automaticity in
issuance. These new visas would coexist alongside existing country visas. No direct
negotiation is proposed to oﬀset the eﬀects of present visa and work permits. The
GATS visa proposal does not extend to work permits, but a suggestion made is that it
might also be possible to extend a framework for GATS Visa if created, to work permit
practices in a similar way, with a new channel. This proposal for now has not made
headway in the WTO, and seemingly for several reasons. One is the general reluctance
of OECD countries to discuss immigration restrictions under the rubric of the GATS,
since they claim that immigration matters (including visas and work permits) do not
constitute a services issue per se. If workers wish to move from one country to another
to achieve higher wages, no international ﬂow of services are involved. OECD concern
has been that allowing any discussion of visas and work permits in the WTO, even
if only involving service providers, potentially creates a precedent for under discus-
sion of these restrictions in the WTO. Another is that the framework of the WTO
implies mutual agreement on a set of common disciplines among all members and in
the visa/work permit area countries seemingly have diﬀerent bilateral interests in the
area. Pressure may come to allow more entry for, say, software engineers from India
to the EU and US, but not software engineers from all countries. Bilateral rather than
multilateral negotiation seems a more natural avenue for these matters.
The current structure of the GATS and even the WTO as a body also does not ﬁt
18The GATS classiﬁes services into 155 service types, and diﬀerentiates between four modes of
supply. The modes are meant to provide a devise for facilitating the making of commitments in
negotiation. Mode 4 refers to service supply that requires the presence of natural persons. These are
cases where a service is supplied by the temporary movement of a services provider to the consumer’s
country of residence. For discussion for other modes of supply, see Whalley (2003) for details.
22well with the type of discussion that labour mobility restrictions seemingly suggest.
The instinct of these involved with the WTO and the GATS is to focus on how issues
with the movement of labour can be related to impacts on trade in goods and trade
in services (e.g. purchases/sales of goods often require personnel from both countries
to travel ﬁrst for contract negotiation), rather than dealing directly with the issues
arising from the inherent misallocation of labour across countries itself. To the extent
this is so, the case for a new negotiating body which more directly takes on visas and
work permits as a problem area rather than as part of the mandate of the WTO is
strengthened.
A further concern is that if WTO/GATS negotiations proceed, the view can become
established that on the one hand all visa and work permit resolution/negotiation can
only proceed through bodies such as the WTO, and that if there is activity taking
place in the WTO then visa/work permit problems are in some sense being taken
care of by current global institutions. Other avenues and the use of new entities are
not excluded. And current GATS Visa proposals for now only relate to the possible
establishment of a new visa channel to coexist alongside existing (and unchanged)
procedures.
We therefore suggest that there may be a choice to be made between seeking
some degree of remedy of visa/work permit practices primarily within the institutional
structure of existing organizations such as WTO, ILO, OECD and others not formed
speciﬁcally to address these problems, or in developing a speciﬁc problem-oriented
new entity (which, of course, also adds to the many others which already exist). It
may be possible to use the two approaches simultaneously, and coordination across
the two would clearly be advantageous, but our sense is that in reality one is more
likely to be the dominant approach. Most of policy discussion thus far presumes
that the GATS in the WTO, and speciﬁcally the Mode 4 discussions in the GATS
is the appropriate venue. Our position is that the advantages and disadvantages in
using existing structures as reﬂected in our present multilateral organizations (e.g.
WTO, OECD) to address issues of global labour mobility and visa and work permit
restrictions should be considered alongside other approaches.
234.3 Using A New Global Entity
We now turn to the possible role that could be played by a new global entity in
providing some relief from the problems described above with current visa/work permit
arrangements. In doing so, we focus on more than international negotiation. We
discuss this role in generalities, rather that detailing actual operation and precise
organizational structure since if our proposal were seriously taken up these matters
would need to be more seriously addressed. Any initiatives on this front would clearly
need more speciﬁcity in exactly how a body would function in terms of its governance
structure.
Given that current visa/work permit practices vary substantially from country
to country and from region to region, one task for a potential new body may be to
push member countries towards using a common cross-country, administrative struc-
ture when imposing existing visa and work permit restrictions. This would help in
terms of transparency, even though it may be to achieve. A useful start may be to
begin to codify and partially standardize existing country based practices as a move
towards a more common internationally agreed structure. Items covered might include
types of visas (e.g. tourist/business/study), types of work permits (e.g specialty oc-
cupational workers, intra-corporate transferees, general workers), length of stay (e.g.
1 month, 3 months, 6 months or above), simpler application procedures, standard-
ized accompanying documents for applications (e.g. standard photo requirements,
commonly agreed documents for identity veriﬁcation), reasonable and cost-based ap-
plication fees, mechanisms for inquiry on application status, eﬀective and eﬃcient
administrative procedures, standard processing time (e.g. targets for usual processing
time), timely responses for application inquiry and notiﬁcation of delay, maximum
tolerance of time delay, clear and simple reappealing procedures.
Member countries could also try to agree standard application and administrative
procedures for granting business visas for regular business visitors. Such standard-
ization might reduce average processing times so that business people could travel
more quickly abroad to take advantage of business opportunities that require quick
responses. For countries having both head oﬃces and branch oﬃces of large multina-
tional corporations that need to move employees frequently from county to country,
it may be in all country’s interests (and also from a global eﬃciency point of view)
to participate and minimize processing times by standardizing procedures for issuing
24visas and work permits to intra-corporate transferees.
In addition to codiﬁcation and standardization of practices, eﬀorts might be made
through a new entity to introduce more transparency into country practices, perhaps
through publication of an annual World Visa and Work Permit Report. Such a report
might include updates on commitments and assess progress that member countries
had made to achieve a common internationally agreed structure for handling labour
mobility restrictions, notiﬁcation of changes in visa/work permit requirements among
member countries, updates on bilateral/regional/global agreements of labour mobility
issues, and other information ﬂow improving measures.
A further element in facilitating more transparency in visa and work permit prac-
tices may be to create a publicly accessible web-site dedicated to providing information
on current visa/work permit practices in member countries, including application and
administrative procedures, application fees, estimates of standard processing times
and possible delays, mechanisms for application inquiry of status and reappealing pro-
cedures, and details of visa wavier programs and exemptions. Providing a one-stop,
timely and detailed information source on global visa/work permit arrangements might
allow users to minimize search costs and make better preparations for applications.
A further role for a new body may also be to identify biases in current eligibil-
ity conditions for visa/permit applications, and to encourage member countries to
mutually agree to remove or remedy such practices. In parallel, such a body could
help member countries to develop internationally agreed and consistent eligibility con-
ditions for visa/work permit applications. Strict eligibility conditions for visa/work
permit applications and these can signiﬁcantly increase the ﬁling and search costs when
hiring foreign workers. Such eligibility conditions are often biased against lower- and
middle-level foreign professionals and workers from developing countries. In contrast,
developed countries generally have a comparative advantage in supplying higher-skilled
and upper-level professionals and executives. By facilitating freer mobility of labour, a
more eﬃcient allocation of labour would be achieved and global output would rise; an
analogous idea to achieving global gains from free trade of goods through negotiated
trade liberalization in the WTO.
There might also be an investigative role for a new global visa/work permit entity,
in attempting to identify non-security and seeming ineﬃcient practices in national
25policies, such as the use of visas for revenue raising purposes. It is not uncommon
for government agencies in some low-income developing countries to impose exacting
restrictions and in eﬀect raise revenues when granting visas and/or work permits to
foreigners. Some countries maintain diﬀerent fee schedules for the same kind of visas
and work permits that only diﬀer in terms of the days for administrative process-
ing. Such practices are ineﬃcient as they constrain the free movement of labour by
increasing the cost of migration. These and other such practices may be mutually
agreed within a new global body to be terminated.
A new body could also investigate the exploitative use of visas and work permits,
say where a national government visa issuing agency requires purchase of insurance by
travelers from a related agency or company they control. Again, the argument would
be that this commercial element in visa issuing practices is ineﬃcient as it increases
the cost of moving labour across countries. Such practices could also be mutually
agreed by member countries in a new organization to be eliminated.
Where clear visa/work permit retaliation is occurring, a new body might also help
in identifying such cases, and even proposing cooperative improvements. If complaints
were allowed to an appellate body by member countries about frequent unjustiﬁed pro-
cessing delay or rejection of visa/work permit issuance by other member countries, such
a body might be able help in bringing the issue forward into discussions and seeking
multilateral cooperation and partial resolution. This may fall short of formal dispute
resolution as in the WTO, but through publicity of reporting and added transparency
achieve similar eﬀects.
In short, a new international entity created speciﬁcally to help address issues re-
lated to visas and work permits could address a series of issue possible speciﬁc problem,
and aim to respond to the many concerns over visa and work permit practices around
the globe. This may be a productive platform for a new agency to be built on rather
than existing multilateral agencies with a broader focus. Unlike the WTO approach
of achieving a negotiated multilateral rule regime, providing a multilateral negoti-
ating forum, along with a mechanism for dispute settlement, such a body could be
informational and investigative as well as providing a forum for bilaterally negotiated
cooperative arrangements and overall policy management.
265 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we discuss the possible role that a new global body might play in pro-
viding some relief from some of the diﬃculties created by current use of visas and work
permits in various countries. The list of possible contributions from such an entity
includes standardization of issuance practices, improvement of transparency, investi-
gation and elimination of inappropriate uses of visa/work permits (such as revenue
raising), and identiﬁcation and resolution of retaliation and inter-county complaints
procedures for visa/work permit practices.
The costs that current visa/work permit practices around the world create for the
global economy in terms of application procedures, administrative processes, process-
ing time, quantitative limits, and rejection of application are large, but little researched
in the literature. Our initial speculative estimates for the potential costs of these re-
strictions seem large, and our conjecture is that they may well inﬂict on the world
economy larger costs than the trade restrictions that the WTO focuses on.
We also discuss the use of the existing multilateral institutional structures to ad-
dress these problems. We suggest that dealing with labour mobility issues through
the WTO and GATS structure may limit the negotiability of many of the practices
which seem to require discipline by linking these issues with trade, and requiring a
multilateral mutually consensual approach. Alternatives, such as ILO or the OECD,
seem to have little to oﬀer. The creation of a new global body for visas and work
permits to us thus seems worth more discussion.
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OECD        
US  General - Tourist  100     
 General - Business      30-90 
 General - Study      60-150 
Canada Single  Entry  54  1  15 
 Study Permit  91     
 Work Permit  109     
 Temporary Resident Permit  145     
UK  Standard (Single Entry)  65  2  14 
 Student  65     
 Visitor in Transit  65     
 Work Permit (6 mth or under)  65     
 Work Permit (over 6 mth)  136     
Japan Single  Entry  27  2-4  14 
 Transit  6     
Germany  Single Entry (up to 30 days)  31     
 Single Entry (up to 31-90 days)  37     
 Study Visa  31     
 Employment Visa  31     
 Airport Transit Visa  13     
France  Short Stay (up to 30 days)  42  3  14 
 Short Stay (up to 31-90 days)  42  3  14 
 Long Stay  119     
 Transit  42     
Australia ETA  Visa  14  1   
 Tourist - Non ETA Visa  50  7  14 
 Business - Non ETA Visa  50  7  14 
ASIA        
Hong Kong  Ordinary Visa  17     
 Transit Visa  9     
Malaysia Tourist  (Single)  15  3  14 
 Business (Single)  15  3  14 
Singapore Entry  Visa  12     
South Korea  Tourist  45  1-2  7 
 Business  45  1-2   
India  Tourist (6 months)  40-60  1   
 Tourist (1 year)  65-85  1   
 Business (6 months)  40-60  1   
 Business (1 year)  65-85  1   
LATIN AMERICA         
Argentina Tourist  30  2   
 Business  50  2   
Brazil Tourist  (US)  110  2   
 Business (US, Engineers)  210  2   
 Business (US, Non-Engineers)  170  2   
 Tourist (Others)  30-60  2   
 Business (Others, Engineers)  130-160  2   
 Business (Others, Non-
Engineers) 
90-120 2   
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Peru Tourist  30  3  14 
 Business  30  3  14 
OTHER EUROPE         
Romania Tourist  (Single)  35  5  21 
 Business (Single)  35  5  21 
Russia Tourist  (processed by 3 days)  200  3   
 Tourist (processed by 10 days)  150  10   
 Business (with Invitation, 3-day 
process) 
200 3  28-42 
 Business (with Invitation, 10-
day process) 
150 10   
 Business (No Invitation, 10-day 
process) 
285 10   
 Business (No Invitation, 17-day 
process) 
185 17   
 Business (No Invitation, 25-day 
process) 
115 25   
MID-EAST        
Kuwait Tourist  40  10   
 Business  40  5   
Saudi Arabia  Business (US, Single/Multiple 
Entry) 
108 3-5  14 
 Business (Others, Single Entry)  54  3-5  14 
 Business (Others, Multiple 
Entry) 
135 3-5  14 
U.A.E. Tourist  (Single)  30  3   
 Tourist (Multiple)  300  3   
 Business (Single)  30  3   
 Business (Multiple)  300  3   
AFRICA        
Kenya  Tourist (Single, 3-day process)  60-90  7  14 
 Tourist (Single, 7-day process)  50-80  7  14 
 Business (Single, 3-day 
process) 
60-90 7  14 
 Business (Single, 7-day 
process) 
50-80 7  14 
South Africa  Tourist  50  2  14 
 Business  50  2  14 
Sudan Tourist  150  7  14-42 
 Business  150  7  14-42 
Zimbabwe  Single Entry (3 months)  55  5-7  14-21 
 Double Entry (3 months)  70  5-7  12-21 
        
*Fee and official processing time are from various government homepages.  Estimated delays are 
from various travel agencies and anecdotes reported in different press references. 
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